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Crime of Dispassion: Eighth Circuit
(Mis)Applies DeShaney in Failing to Hold
State Employees Accountable to
the Children They Protect
S.S. ex reL Jervis v.McMullen1
I. INTRODUCTION
The fact that children in the United States are far more likely to suffer acts
of violence in their homes than outside of them is a continuing national crisis and
shame.' The statistics can be mind-numbing,3 but, often, the facts surrounding a
single case have an opposite, shocking effect on the observer. Particularly
because child abuse cases are so emotionally charged, the dispassionate manner
in which courts typically address legal claims arising from the abuse can
exacerbatethe alreadyinflamedpassions oftheuninitiated-and, sometimes, even
the long-time--observer. More often than not, a court's reluctance to allow the
particular facts of a case to color its legal analysis is necessary and laudable.
Occasionally, however, the outrage in response to such deliberation is justified.
Beyond the obvious maxim that perpetrators of violence against children
should be punished, the question arises whether state agencies, ortheir employees,
holding themselves out as the protectors of children, should be held legally
accountable to the children they protect when they make reckless decisions that
endanger a child's welfare. In S.S. ex rel.Jervisv.McMulen,4 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit addressed this question directly and, inthe
process, perpetuated, and perhaps expanded, a long line of Supreme Court

1. 225 F.3d 960 (8th Cir. 2000) (en bane), cert. denied, 121 S.Ct. 1227 (2001).
2. See Tania Schriwer, Comment, EstablishinganAffirmative GovernmentaIDuly
to ProtectChildren'sRights: The EuropeanCourtoffHuman Rights as aModelforthe
UnitedStates Supreme Court,34 U.S.F. L. REV. 379, 380 (2000) (citing US. Children
Safer on the Streets than atHome, Says PreventChildAbuseAmerica,P.R.NEWSWVME,
Mar. 30, 1999, available at LEXIS News Library, Wire Service Stories File).
3. See Sehriwer, supra note 2, at 379. During the 1990s, the State of Missouri
reported 239 child deaths related to abuse or neglect NANcY PEDDLE & CHING-TUNG
WANG, CURRENT TRENDS iN CHILD ABUSE PREVENMON, RE oRTNG AND FATAL=

16-17 (Nat'l Ctr. on Child Abuse Prevention Research, Worldng Paper No. 808, 2001),
availableat http:/www.preventchildabuse.org. Nationwide, there were 6,322 fatalities
related to abuse. Id.
4. 225 F.3d 960 (8th Cir. 2000) (en bane), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct 1227 (2001).
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precedent rendering it virtually impossible for a child to succeed in claiming a
substantive due process violation at the hands of the state.
This Note reviews the legal landscape of FourteenthAmendment substantive
due process theory promulgated by the Supreme Court and discusses the
importance of the landmark decision in DeShaney v. Winnebago County
Department of Social Services5 in that context. Next, this Note discusses the
treatment of DeShaney by the circuit courts, focusing on two exceptions to
DeShaney's analysis that have been carved out by many courts. This Note then
reviews the decision inMcMullen, and argues that the court of appeals improperly
applied DeShaney to the facts in McMullen and that, in any event, DeShaney is
an unfortunate extension of an unduly restrictive approach to Fourteenth
Amendment claims. Finally, this Note suggests that the current stance of the
federal courts on state actors' constitutional liability to children endangered by
their actions warrants a voluntary state review of tort legislation so that children
like S.S. are not left without options for redressing harm inflicted by their selfdescribed protectors.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Shortly before her third birthday, in January of 1994, S.S. was taken into
protective custody by the Missouri Division of Family Services ("DFS") on the
basis of allegations of abuse at the hands of her parents.6 On April 5, 1994, the
Circuit Court of Cass County placed S.S. in the permanent custody of DFS for
placement in foster care.' During the time that DFS had custody of S.S., Michelle
McMullen, one of the social workers assigned to S.S.'s case by DFS, permitted
supervised visits between S.S. and her father.' Also present during these meetings
was Joel Griffis, a friend of S.S.'s father and a convicted child molester.
Although no one with DFS was aware of Griffis's molestation record at the time
of these visits, it later became apparent to the DFS employees handling S.S.'s
case that Griffis posed a significant danger to S.S."1
5. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
6. McMullen, 225 F.3d at 964. S.S. was allegedly locked in her room for extended
periods of time by both of her parents and sexually abused by an unknown person. Id.
S.S.'s father also allegedly smeared human feces on S.S.'s face. Id. at 964-65.
7. Id. at 965.
8. Id. In addition to McMullen, Division of Family Services ("DFS") employees
handling S.S.'s case included social worker Sherry Jacoby and Kathleen Barnett, who
supervised both Jacoby and McMullen. Id.; see infra note 17 and accompanying text.
9. McMullen, 225 F.3d at 965.
10. Id. DFS's awareness of this danger is well documented. McMullen received
an anonymous phone call in September of 1995 alerting her to Griffis's convictionrecord
and to the fact that he was spending time with S.S. and her father. Id. She also was
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Nevertheless, beginning on March 8, 1996, S.S. was permitted to live with
her father on an "extended visit" basis." She remained in her father's home on
this basis until McMullen petitioned the court to release S.S. from the custody of
DFS and return her to her father's permanent custody, a request the court granted
on August 22, 1996.12 In February of 1997, a caller to a Jackson County child
abuse hotline stated that Griffis had sexually molested S.S. twice inNovember of
1996 and January of 1997.' Griffis was charged withtwo counts offirst-degree
statutory sodomy, and S.S.'s father was charged with four counts of felony child
endangerment' 4 S.S. was hospitalized for a week for treatment of her injuries,
and she was hospitalized in a Kansas City psychiatric facility at the time the
subsequent complaint on her behalf was filed."
S.S. brought an action, through her guardian ad litem, in the United States
District Court for the Western District of Missouri claiming violation of her
procedural and substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment
and seeking damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.16 McMullen, as well as Sherry

informed through multiple sources that Griffshadbeenallowedto have contactwith S.S.
on at least nine occasions during the time DFS had custody of S.S. Id. A psychologist
warned DFS, on the basis of his evaluation of S.S.'s father, that the father seemed
"dangerously sympathetic with a known child sexual offender, which would appear to be
a very risky behavior" and that "plans toward reunification should proceed cautiously."
Id. McMullen also became aware, through a child abuse hotline call, of vaginal rashes

suffered by S.S. and that a convicted child molester S.S. referred to as "grandpa"
frequented the home ofher father. Id. AlthoughMcMuleninspected S.S. at her day care
facility, she did not arrange to have S.S. examined by a physician. Id. McMullen also
received a phone call from Grifs during which Griffis complained that DFS was unfairly
limiting his contact with S.S. Id.
Jacobyreceived a call from S.S.'s fostermother in June of 1995 wherein Jacoby was
informed that "S. told [the foster mother] over and over that she humps with her daddy,
Jon." Id. Jacoby also knew of at least three other instances of inappropriate sexual
behavior exhibited by S.S. and, like McMullen, received phone calls alerting her to the
fact that Griffis was spending time with S.S. Id. Finally, Jacoby became aware in
December of 1995 that S.S. suffered from a yeast infection and was "hurting in her
vaginal area." Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. McMullen's own records indicate that on the date of S.S.'s return to her
father's permanent custody, she and her supervisor, Barnett, decided "that if something
happens to S.S. because [the father] knows what Joell [sic] has done in the past that he
will be solely responsible." Id. at 965-66.
13. Id. at 966. Griffis was living with S.S. and her father at the time of these
incidents. Id.
14. Id.

15. Id.
16. Id. at 962.
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Jacoby and Kathleen Barnett, were named as defendants in the suit." In her
complaint, S.S. alleged that the defendants violated her constitutional rights in
releasing her to her father's permanent custody despite having notice that her
father was allowing contact between S.S. and, Griffis, a known pedophile. 8 The
complaint alleged that such action by the defendants displayed "deliberate and
conscious indifference to [S.S.'s] safety and well-being and violate[d] S.S.'s
constitutional right to be reasonably safe from harm."' 9 The district court granted
the defendants' request for dismissal, relying upon the Supreme Court's decision
inDeShaney." "The courtheld that S.S. lacked any substantive due process right
to be protected
from Griffis," a private citizen, by the defendants as state
21
employees.
On appeal, a three-judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit reversed the dismissal of S.S.'s complaint.' Thepanel rejectedthe
position of the defendants and the district court that DeShaney mandated a
dismissal of S.S.'s claim, holding that such "reliance is misplaced because it
obscures the affirmative nature of the defendants' misconduct." The panel held
that while DeShaney and its progeny stand for the proposition that state actors
have no general affirmative duty to protect private citizens from each other, S.S.'s
complaint was distinguishable because the defendants took affirmative action to
place S.S. in a position of danger rather than merely failing to act on her behalf.24
To the extent S.S.'s complaint alleged such "state-created danger," the panel held
it successfully "thread[ed] an elusive needle" allowed for by circuit precedent and
2
that it stated a "viable claim," notwithstanding DeShaney. 1
On rehearing en bane, the court of appeals rejected the decision of its threejudge panel and affirmed the district court's dismissal of S.S.'s complaint.26
While the court acknowledged that "if the state acts affirmatively to place
someone in a position of danger that he or she would not otherwise have faced, the
state actor, depending on his or her state of mind, may have commited a
17. Id. at 965. Although Cynthia M. Montgomery, Ph.D., was named as a
defendant in the original action, she was not a party in the instant appeal.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 969.
20. S.S. ex rel. Jervis v.McMullen, 186 F.3d 1066, 1068-69 (8th Cir. 1999), rev'd,
225 F.3d 960 (8th Cir. 2000), cert.denied, 121 S. Ct. 1227 (2001).
21. Id. at 1069. The district court also dismissed S.S.'s procedural due process
claim, which S.S. did not appeal. Id. at 1069 n.2.
22. Id. at 1069.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1069-70.
25. Id. at 1072.
26. S.S. ex rel Jervis v. McMullen, 225 F.3d 960, 962 (8th Cir. 2000) (en bane),
cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 1227 (2001).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol66/iss4/5

4

Berry: Berry: Crime of Dispassion:

2001]

(MS)APPLYNG DESHANEY

constitutionaltort,"' the court held thatno suchliability arose in this case"for the
simple reason that in returning S.S. to her father, the state did not increase the
danger ofsignificant harmto S.S.' *u Rather, the court held that the state "merely"
returned S.S. to the same situation from which she originally hadbeen exracted
Additionally, the court held that even if it is assumed, arguendo, that the state
acted affirmatively to place S.S. in a new position of danger, the conduct of the
defendants in this case did not reach the level of egregiousness required by the
Supreme Court to trigger the protections afforded by 42 U.S.C. § 1983.?'
Specifically, the conduct of the defendants vis i vis S.S., while sufficient to show
ordinary negligence, did not "shock the conscience" of the court, in that it did not
evince the type of "deliberate indifference," "abuse of power," or failure to
"comport with traditional ideas of fair play and decency" required to shock the
court's conscience.31 When a state removes a child from parental custody on the
grounds of abuse, and later negligently returns the child to the same environment
with notice of an identical level of danger of significant harm to the child, such
state action does not violate the child's substantive due process rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment or 42 U.S.C. § 1983.2
Il. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. "Affirmative Duties" Under 42 US. C. § 1983
and the FourteenthAmendment
The last few decades have seen the emergence of 42 U.S.C. § 19831 as "the
primary vehicle for litigation requiring state officials to obey the commands of
federal constitutional or statutorylaw." Based onthe Supreme Court's treatment

27. Id.
28. Id.

29. Id.
30. Id. at 963.
31. Id. at 964 (quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846-47
(1988)).
32. Id. at 962.
33. This Section provides, in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage,. . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action
at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
34. WILLmIMCoHEN&JoNATHND.VARATCoNsnTm oNALLAw: CAsEsAND
MARIALs 1149 (10th ed. 1997).
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of this provision, however, the private citizen seeking to vindicate her Fourteenth
Amendment substantive due process rights through the gate of § 1983 will find it
a narrow passage indeed.
Time and again, the Court has reiterated its steadfast refusal to allow § 1983
to turn the Fourteenth Amendment into a "font of tort law to be superimposed
upon whatever systems may already be administered by the States. 35 The Court
consistently has interpreted the Constitution strictly in this regard, holding that the
Constitution "does not purport to supplant traditional tort law in laying down rules
of conduct to regulate liability for injuries that attend living together in society. 36
That this remains today the conscious and deliberate approach to adjudicating
substantive due process claims against state actors is clear, given the language of
a recent Court opinion.37
Equally apparent is the interpretive bedrock upon which the Court's rigorous
scrutiny of § 1983 claims is built. Judge Richard Posner's oft-quoted description
of the Bill of Rights as a "charter of negative liberties3 8 drives much of the
Court's approach to the Constitution in general, and the Fourteenth Amendment
specifically. This view of the Constitution, which dates at least to the Court's
narrow approach to the Fourteenth Amendment adopted in the Slaughter-House

35. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976).
36. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332 (1986).
37. See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 848 (1988) ("[W]e have
made it clear that the due process guarantee does not entail a body of constitutional law
imposing liability whenever someone cloaked with state authority causes harm.).
38. Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616,618 (7th Cir. 1982). The dictum from which
this phrase is taken is worthy of lengthier quotation:
There is a constitutional right not to be murdered by a state officer, for the
state violates the Fourteenth Amendment when its officer, acting under color
of state law, deprives a person of life without due process of law. But there is
no constitutional right to be protected by the state against being murdered by
criminals or madmen. It is monstrous if the state fails to protect its residents
against such predators but it does not violate the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment or, we suppose, any other provision of the
Constitution. The Constitution is a charter of negative liberties; it tells the
state to let people alone; it does not require the federal government or the state
to provide services, even so elementary a service as maintaining law and
order. Discrimination in providing protection against private violence could
of course violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
But that is not alleged here. All that is alleged is a failure to protect Miss
Bowers and others like her from a dangerous madman, and as the State of
Illinois has no federal constitutional duty to provide such protection its failure
to do so is not actionable under [§] 1983.
Id. (citations omitted).
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Cases,9 has resulted in the Court's recognition of only "negative rights, which
require the government to refrain from certain conduct, as opposed to positive
rights, which impose affirmative duties on the government to take actions or
expand resources to meet the needs of certain citizens." ' This reading of the
Constitution has led the Court to refuse to impose upon the states a Fourteenth
Amendment duty to fund abortion services forpoor womenl protect citizens from
acts ofviolenceperpetratedbyotherprivate citizens, 2 orprotectstate government
workers from hazardous work conditions. 3 In sum, the Court has promulgated a
formidable body of law that establishes its firm commitmentto the ideathat "there
may be Constitutional sins of commission, but not of omission.' This doctrine
is no less apparent in the Court's stance regarding the existence of a state's
obligation to protect children.
B. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services
The quintessential decision enunciating the Supreme Court's stance on a
state's obligation to protect children from private abuse is DeShane,. The facts
that gave rise to that decision are chilling. The Winnebago County Department

39. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (1 WalL) 36, 78 (1872) (narrowly
construing the reach of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment); see also Michael J. Gerhardt, The Ripple Effects of Slaughter-House: A
Critique of a Negative Rights riew of the Constitution, 43 VAND. L. REv. 409,410
(1990).
40. Gerhardt,supra note 39, at 410.
41. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297,316-17 (1980).
42. See DeShaney v. Wimnebago County Dep't of Soo. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195
(1989).
43. See Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 126 (1992). In addition
tothe "negative liberties" rationale for narrowly construing a state's obligationto protect
its citizens, the doctrine of Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity has been invoked
frequently in several recent and sharply divided Court decisions. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of
Univ. ofAla. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356,121 S. Ct. 955,960 (2001) (5-4 decision) (holding
that Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity applied to suits against a state under the
Americans with Disabilities Act); Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 67
(2000) (5-4 decision) (holding that Congress exceeded its authority in purporting to
authorize citizen suits against a non-consenting state under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act); see also Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996) (holding
that Congress exceeded its authority in purporting to abrogate Florida's immunity from
being sued by an Indian tribe via the Indian Commerce Clause); Hans v. Louisiana, 134
U.S. 1, 15 (1890) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment barred a suit by a citizen of
Louisiana seeking to compel payment due on a state-issued bond).
44. William Wayne Justice, Thurgood MarshallMedal of Justice Award:
Remarks, G(o. J. oN POVERTY L. & POL'Y 413,413 (2000).
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of Social Services ("DSS") received word in 1982 that a four-year-old boy,
Joshua DeShaney, suffered beatings at the hands of his father.4" When Joshua
received treatment in early 1983 for multiple bruises and abrasions, the state took
temporary custody of him, but DSS released him three days later for lack of
sufficient evidence of abuse. 6 Despite the implementation of measures designed
to protect Joshua,47 emergency personnel reported to DSS one month later that
Joshua againhad been treated for suspicious injuries." Subsequent-visits by DSS
caseworkers revealed non-compliance with the terms agreed to earlier by Joshua's
father, and, in late 1983, DSS again received a report that Joshua had been given
emergency treatment.4 9 No remedial action was taken by DSS in response to any
of these first-hand observations or third-party reports.5"
In March of 1984, Joshua's father beat him so badly that Joshua suffered
"brain damage so severe that he is expected to spend the rest of his life confined
to an institution for the profoundly retarded." ' When told ofthe attack on Joshua,
the caseworker assigned to his case expressed a lack of surprise. 2 Joshua and his
mother brought an action under § 1983 against Winnebago County, DSS, and
certain DSS employees, claiming Joshua's FourteenthAmendment substantive due
process rights were violated by the state in its refusal to intervene in a situation
that the state knew to be dangerous to Joshua.53
In its ruling, the Supreme Court held that no constitutional right is infringed
when a state fails to protect a child from harm inflicted by a private citizen. 4
Drawing upon its firmly entrenched "negative liberties" approach to the
Fourteenth Amendment,55 the Court concluded that the Constitution afforded
Joshua "no affirmative right to government aid, even when such aid may be
necessary to secure life."56 Although the Court agreed with Joshua that the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause protects citizens from state-initiated
45. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 192
(1989).
46. Id.
47. Id. Joshua's father agreed to comply with voluntary measures, including
counseling, encouraging his girlfriend to move out of the home, and entering Joshua in
a preschool program. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 192-93.
50. Id. at 193.
51. Id.
52. Id. "I just knew the phone would ring some day and Joshua would be dead."
Id. at 209.
53. Id. at 193.
54. Id. at 201.
55. See supranotes 38-44 and accompanying text.
56. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 196.
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deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, it declined
Joshua's invitationto read the Fourteenth Amendment to "impose an affirmative
obligation on the State to ensure that those interests do not come to harm through
other means."51 The only circumstance the Court conceded may give rise to a
state's affirmative duty to protect acitizenfromprivate harm arises whenthe state
has created a "special relationship" with an individual by depriving him or her of
the ability to protect himself or herself from harm, and harm comes to the
individual while he or she is in state custody.58
In a vigorous dissent, Justice Brennan argued that in choosing to maintain a
system for addressing child welfare issues, a choice that the state admittedly is
under no constitutional obligation to make, the state acted affirmatively to an
extentthat opened the door to liability under the Constitution for failing to operate
that system in amannerthatbrings no harm to children such as Joshua." Through
its "monopolization of a particular path ofrelief," effectively cutting Joshua off
from private-sector sources of relief, such as churches, other social service
agencies, schools, police, or hospitals, the state, according to Brennan, tookupon
itself a positive duty to intervene on his behalf and, at the same time, could not
claim immunity from constitutional liability.61

57. Id. at 195.
58. Id. at 199-201; see Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307,319 (1982) (holding
thatamentallyretarded individual who was involuntarily committed to a state institution
had a constitutionally-protected right to safe conditions of confinement); Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (holding that a prisoner whose medical needs were
ignored by prison officials had a cause of action under § 1983).
59. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 204-05 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
60. Id.at 207 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 210 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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In a separate and frequently-quoted dissent of his own,62 Justice Blaclmun
questioned the majority's contention that the Court was bound by its past
interpretive approach to the Fourteenth Amendment.63 Blackmun maintained that
the question whether to interpret due process provisions broadly or narrowly was
not a necessarily settled one, and that the facts of Joshua's case should compel a
"sympathetic reading,... which comports with dictates offundamental justice and
recognizes that compassion need not be exiled from the province ofjudging."'
C. Circuits'Application ofDeShaney
The strict due process analysis inDeShaneyhas cast a long shadow over the
lower federal courts' consideration of the states' obligation to protect abused
children.65 Nevertheless, two narrow exceptions to DeShaney's "no affirmative
duty" rule recognized by some lower federal courts-the "state-created danger"
exception and the "special relationship" exception -together provide a loophole

62. The first sentence ofthe following excerpt from Blackmun's passionate dissent,
which acknowledges directly the poignant nature of the facts of the case, has been quoted
often:
Poor Joshua! Victim of repeated attacks by an irresponsible, bullying,
cowardly, and intemperate father, and abandoned by respondents who placed
him in a dangerous predicament and who knew or learned what was going on,
and yet did essentially nothing except, as the Court revealingly observes,....
"dutifully recorded these incidents in [their] files." It is a sad commentary
upon American life, and constitutional principles-so full of late of patriotic
fervor and proud proclamations about "liberty and justice for all"-that this
child, Joshua DeShaney, now is assigned to live out the remainder of his life
profoundly retarded. Joshua and his mother, as petitioners here, deserve-but
now are denied by this Court-the opportunity to have the facts of their case
considered in the light of the constitutional protection that [§ 1983] is meant
to provide.
Id. at 213 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 212-13 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 213 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
65. "Most courts now apply a strict DeShaneyanalysis, denying all substantive due
process claims where the child is in physical custody of his parent even when the state has
retained legal custody." Michele Miller, Note, Revisiting PoorJoshua: State-Created
DangerTheory in the FosterCare Context, HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 243,251 (2000);
see also Bank of Ill. v. Over, 65 F.3d 76, 77 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that the presence
of a court order barring contact between a child and her subsequent abuser did not
distinguish the case from the facts present in DeShaney);Blalock v. Tellus, 22 F. Supp.
2d 1217, 1221 (D. Kan. 1998) (holding that a state's legal custody of a child without
physical custody falls short of creating a special relationship exception to DeShaney).
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by which some courts dissatisfied with a strict DeShaney analysis have afforded
"cover" for children asserting substantive due process claims against a state.
In those jurisdictions that recognize it, the "state-created danger" exception
can arise when, for example, "a child, though in legal custody of the state, resides
with a natural parent and suffers injury due to abuse.' 5 The development of this
exception was aresponse to the DeShaney Court's assertionthatthe state "played
no part in [the] creation [of dangers faced by Joshua], nor did it do anything to
render him more vulnerable to them." Seizing upon the inverse implication of
this language, some courts have "conclude[d] that if the state acts atffnnatively
to place someone in a position of danger that he or she would not otherwise have
faced, the state actor, depending on his or her state of mind, mayhave committed
a constitutional tort." Circuits that have adopted the "state-created danger"
exception in this context include the Fifth, 69 Seventh,70 Eighth 7 Ninth, Tenth,
and Eleventh74 Circuits. The Third Circuit specifically has reserved judgment
concerning adoption of this exception. 5
The "special relationship" exceptionto the rule announced inDeShaneywas
acknowledged specifically by the DeShaney Court. 76 The Court held that the
rulings of Estelle v. Gamble7 ' and Youngberg v. Romeo together "stand... for

66. Miller, supranote 65, at 251; see Courier v. Doran, 23 F. Supp. 2d 1277, 1280
(D.N.M. 1998); Tazioly v. City of Philadelphia, No. CIV.A. 97-CV-1219, 1998 WL
633747, at *9-10 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 10, 1998).
67. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201.
68. S.S. ex rel.Jervis v. McMullen, 225 F.3d 960, 962 (8th Cir. 2000) (ea bane),
cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 1227 (2001).
69. See Johnsonv. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 38 F.3d 198,200 (5thCir. 1994),cert.
denied,514 U.S. 1017 (1995).
70. See K.I ex rel.Murphy v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846, 849 (7th Cir. 1990).
71. See Gregory v. City of Rogers, 974 F.2d 1006, 1010 (8th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied,507 U.S. 913 (1993).
72. See Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 590 (9th Cir. 1989).
73. See Uhlrig v. Harder, 64 F.3d 567,572 (10th Cir. 1995).
74. See Cornelius v. Town of Highland Lake, 880 F.2d 348, 352-53 (11th Cir.
1989), cert. denied, Spears v. Cornelius, 494 U.S. 1066 (1990).
75. Mark v. Borough ofHatboro, 51 F.3d 1137, 1152 (3d Cir. 1995), cert.denied,
516 U.S. 858 (1995).
76. See supranote 58 and accompanying text.
77. 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (holding that state prisoners may have a cause of
action against state actors for failure to deliver appropriate medical care).
78. 457 U.S. 307,317 (1982) (holding that an involuntarily committed patienthas
constitutionallyprotected liberty interests underthe FourteenthAmendmenttoreasonably
safe conditions of confinement freedom from unreasonable bodily restraints, and
adequate training).
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the proposition that when the State takes a person into its custody and holds him
there against his will, the Constitution imposes upon it a corresponding duty to
assume some responsibility for his safety and general well-being.' ' 9 While the
Court viewed Joshua DeShaney's situation as outside the realm of the EstelleYoungberg exception, subsequent lower court decisions have expressed a
willingness to stretch the exception to apply to various other settings."0
The foregoing discussion suggests a willingness on the part of some courts
to mitigate the perceived harshness of DeShaney while largely adhering to its
"negative liberties" philosophy. Largely unanswered, however, has been the
question whether courts will consider the plight of children returned by the state
to dangerous parents' custody to be within the realm of the exceptions to
DeShaney espoused by some lower courts.
IV. INSTANT DECISION
A. The Majority
In McMullen, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
applied DeShaney to the § 1983 claim of a girl who alleged that employees of
DFS violated her substantive due process rights by returning her to the parental
home from which DFS had taken her more than two years earlier. 1 The girl
alleged that by returning her to her father despite notice that she would be in
contact with a known pedophile, who, in fact, subsequently sodomized her on at

79. DeShaney v. Winnebago CountyDep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 199-200
(1989).
80. See Kitzman-Kelly v. Warner, 203 F.3d 454,458 (7th Cir. 2000) (ward of the
State of Illinois alleged sexual abuse by state's intern); Norfleet ex rel. Norfleet v. Ark.
Dep't of Human Servs., 989 F.2d 289, 293 (8th Cir. 1993) (asthmatic child died while
in custody offoster parent); Yvonne L. ex rel.Lewis v. N.M. Dep't of Human Servs., 959
F.2d 883, 893 (10th Cir. 1992) (child abused by employee of privately operated crisis
shelter group home while in legal and physical custody of state); Wells v. Walker, 852
F.2d 368, 370 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied,489 U.S. 1021 (1989) (special relationship
exception may apply when the state releases a prisoner to the closest bus stop and a bus
stop employee is killed by the prisoner); Fox v. Custis, 712 F.2d 84, 88 (4th Cir. 1983)
(state may be liable under § 1983 for failing to protect inmates who are in known danger
of harm by themselves or other inmates); Ford v. Johnson, 899 F. Supp. 227, 231 (W.D.
Pa. 1995) (state-created danger theory may apply when a child is beaten to death by his
father after the state relinquishes custody to the father).
81. S.S. ex rel. Jervis v. McMullen, 225 F.3d 960, 962-63 (8th Cir. 2000) (en
bane), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 1227 (2001). Judge Morris Arnold wrote for a seven-tothree majority, with Judge Gibson writing in dissent.
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least two occasions, DFS acted unconstitutionally and was liable for damages
under § 1983.2
The court's analysis began with an acknowledgment that as the "locus
classicus" for determining the merit of claims like S.S.'s, DeShaney was the
appropriate springboard for the court's opinion.' The court characterized the
central holding of DeShaney as stating that the purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment was to protect the people from the state and not to require the state
to protect private citizens from each other.' While the court acknowledged that
itwas one of several courts that had announced a"state-created danger" exception
to DeShaney's holding, the court held that S.S. could not benefit from the
exception "for the simple reason that in returning S.S. to her father, the state did
not increase the danger of significant harm to S.S. It merely placed herback into
the situation from which it had originally retrieved her." The court maintained
that, in this regard, DeShaney "[spoke] specifically to" the factual setting before
the court when it held that in returning Joshua DeShaney to his father, the State
of Wisconsin placed him in no worse a position than if it had not acted at all.'
This aspect of DeShaney, the court argued, had been emphasized by previous
decisions in the Eighth Circuit' The fact that two and one-half years elapsed
between the time that DFS took S.S. into custody and the time that she was
returned to her father's permanent custody did not impact the court's legal
calculus."
The court acknowledgedKtH. ex reL Murphyv.Morgan' as anextra-circuit
case involving facts "arguably similar" to the case subjudice and whichreached
a contrary result 9" The court distinguished Murphy, however, because in that
case the state took affrmative steps to place K.H. in a new position of danger
when it placed her in an abusive foster home, rather than returning her to the
parental home from which the state initially rescued her.91 While the court
conceded that distinguishing between exposure of a child by the state to a new
danger and returning a child to the same position of danger from which she was
removed '"may seem to some to be gratuitous," the court held that such a

82. Id. at 962.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. (citing Wells v. Walker, 852 F.2d 368, 368-70 (8th Cir. 1988), cert.denied,
489 U.S. 1012 (1989)).
88. But see infranote 117 and accompanying text
89. 914 F.2d 846 (7th Cir. 1990).
90. McMullen, 225 F.3d at 963.
91. Id.; seeMurplhy, 914 F.2d at 848-49.
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distinction is necessary and "one, moreover, that we think DeShaney requires us
to draw." 1
The court went onto address what it considered to be another insurmountable
obstacle to S.S.'s claim-that even if the state had acted affirmatively to place
S.S. in anewposition of danger, the court did not find that DFS's actions vis 4vis
S.S. rose to the level of egregiousness necessary to support S.S.'s due process
claim' The court held that because of the "level of risk that a reasonable person
would have assumed S.S. might be exposed to" 4 and the fact that it was S.S.'s
father seeking custody, S.S. had made a case for negligence only." The state's
obligation to return a child to her parents if possible led the court to distinguish
sharply between such a case and a case, likeMurphy, where the child is placed in
a foster home.9" The court looked to a substantial Supreme Court literature
regarding the level of egregiousness a state's conduct must reach to support a §
1983 claim' The court noted that the Supreme Court consistently has held that
such claims must allege acts that"shockthe conscience" ofa reviewing court; acts
of negligence, gross negligence, or even recklessness will not suffice. 98
Notwithstanding the court's acknowledgment "that the acts that S.S. claims were
perpetrated against her ...were utterly indecent and egregious [and] ...shock
[our conscience]," the court, nonetheless, stated that the proper inquiry was not
into the acts of S.S.'s father but into the acts of the State of Missouri that S.S.
blamed for her injuries. 99 The Supreme Court's stalwart insistence that the
Fourteenth Amendment not become a "font of tort law to be superimposed upon
whatever systems may be administered by the States" compelled the court of
appeals, in its view, to find S.S.'s claim wanting."°
B. The Dissent
The dissent argued that DeShaney involved facts sufficiently dissimilar to
those subjudice so as to render its rationale inapplicable to a proper disposition
of S.S.'s claim.' Arguing that DeShaney limited only the "positive liberty" of

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

McMullen, 225 F.3d at 963.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 963-64.
Id. at 964.
Id. For a recent exposition of this doctrine, see County ofSacranentov. Lewis,

523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998).
99. McMullen, 225 F.3d at 964.
100. Id. (quoting Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976)).
101. Id. (Gibson, J., dissenting).
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protection by the state from private danger, the dissent contended that S.S. had
stated a claim based on the "negative liberty" of protection from hann at the
handsofthe state." Indeed, because S.S. did not allegethattthe statehadviolated
a "positive" liberty, the dissent contended that the two recognized exceptions to
a state's non-liabilityforfailureto preventcitizen-on-citizenviolence---the "statecreated danger" exception and the "special relationship" exception-were not
applicable in this case."° While the dissent credited the majority for recognizing
the important difference between failure to protect and affimative acts of
endangerment, it argued, nonetheless, that the majority erred in "deciding where
to draw the line between action and inaction."" The decision in DeShaney is
inapposite to this case, the dissent claimed, because Joshua DeShaney attempted
to locate a constitutional violationinWisconsin's failure to act, while S.S. alleged
Missouri's decision to act was, itself; a constitutional violation."'
The dissent criticized the majority's distinction between exposing a child to
new dangers and returning her to old ones, and Murphy's distinction between
fosterparents andnaturalparents as "arbitrary." ' 5 Rather, the dissent stated, the
better distinction is "whether the state actors have so intervened in the child's
situation that they can be said to have rescued the child from danger. At that
point, the child's fate is in the state's hands, whether it decides to entrust him to
stranger or kin, to new dangers or old. '
The dissent also challenged the majority's holding that S.S. failed to allege
acts sufficiently egregious to establish a violation of her Fourteenth Amendment
lgihts." g Noting that the majority conceded "deliberate indifference" sometimes
may meet a "shocks the conscience" test, 0l the dissent next stated that this was
such a case, given the fact that DFS had time to deliberate in making its decisions

102. Id. at 966 (Gibson, J., dissenting). The dissent quoted at length from Judge
Posner's opinion inMurphy in support of the distinction between positive and negative
liberty claims. Id. (Gibson, J., dissenting); see K.H. ex rel Murphyv. Morgan, 914 F.2d
846, 848-49 (7th Cir. 1990).
103. McMullen, 225 F.3d at 966 n.3 (Gibson, J.,
dissenting).
104. Id. at 967 (Gibson, J.,
dissenting).
105. Id. (Gibson, J.,
dissenting).
106. Id. at 968 (Gibson, J.,
dissenting).
107. Id. (Gibson, J., dissenting). The Mr.1fullen dissent cites Courierv. Doran,
23 F. Supp. 2d 1277 (D.N.M. 1998), and Tazio yv. City ofPhiladelphia,No. C1V.A. 97CV-1219, 1998 WL 633747 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 10, 1998), in support of the argument that
whether the state places a rescued child in a foster home or back in a parent's home is
immaterial. See also DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S.
189,210 (1989) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
108. McMullen, 225 F.3d at 968 (Gibson, J.,
dissenting).
109. Id. at 969 (Gibson, J., dissenting).
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vis ivis S.S." ° The dissent did not challenge the appropriateness of the Supreme
Court's "shocks the conscience" standard directly; it simply argued that the
actions of the DFS employees responsible for S.S. while she was in state custody
met the standard."'
V. COMMENT
The decision inMcMullen reflects and perpetuates a longstanding resistance
on the part of the federal courts to interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment as
imposing affirmative duties upon the states. It is apparent that the majority in
McMullen felt compelled byDeShaneytorejectS.S.'s claim."' Itis less obvious,
however, that DeShaney directly addressed the claim raised by S.S. or-even if
the case was on point-that the reasoning in DeShaney should be perpetuated at
all.
The facts of DeShaney and the claim made by the plaintiff in that case are
distinguishable from those inMcMullen. As theMcMullen dissent noted, Joshua
DeShaney never claimed that the State of Wisconsin violated his constitutional
rights in returning him to his father."' Rather, Joshua claimed that his due
process rights were violated when the state did nothing to protect him after the
state relinquished custody to his father."' In doing so, Joshua issued a more direct
challenge to the Supreme Court's traditional FourteenthAmendmentjurisprudence
than did S.S., who claimed not that the state failed to act but rather that the state
did act in a harmful manner.' Also noteworthy is the fact that, while Joshua
DeShaney was taken into temporary custody and quickly returned to his father,
S.S. was in the permanent custody of the state for more than two years. 6 Rather
than focusing on the single act of returning S.S. to her father two years after taking
full responsibility for her well-being, the court in McMullen viewed the entire
period of state custody as one state action. In doing so, "the court was able to
shift the issue from whether the state harmed S.S., to whether the danger to which

110. Id. (Gibson, J., dissenting). In this regard, the dissent applied a discussion in
County ofSacramentov. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 851 (1998), wherein the Supreme Court
distinguished between reckless police chases of fleeing motorists or prison guards

responding to a riot on one hand, and the sort of lengthy decisionmaking that occurred in
this case on the other. McMullen, 225 F.3d at 969 (Gibson, J., dissenting).

111.
112.
113.
(1989).
114.
115.
116.

Id. (Gibson, J., dissenting).
Id. at 963.
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 197

Id.
McMullen, 225 F.3d at 967 (Gibson, J.,dissenting).

Id. at 963.
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she was exposed differed from the reason forher removal, a factor that should not
merit constitutional significance.""'
Even if it is assumed, arguendo, that DeShaney speaks directly to S.S.'s
claim, it is not at all clear that DeShaney represents a rationale worthy of
emulation. The DeShaney Court's uncritical allegiance to the longstanding
federalist concerns previously exhibitedbythe Court in interpreting the Fourteenth
Amendment is troubling. Proponents ofthe decisionhave argued that DeShaney
reflects an adherence to the Constitution's text, that it honors the Framers' intent,
that it is appropriately federalist in its perspective, and that it protects against a
spate of constitutional tort litigation that would overwhelmthe judicial system."'
While these arguments are formidable,"' it remains the case that the Supreme
Court; as the final arbiter ofconstitutional doctrine, is free to imbue the Fourteenth
Amendmentwiththe empowering effect originallyintended, rather than acquiesce
to what the DeShaney Court characterized as a foregone and immutable
conclusion.'
Despite the Court's clear preference for arguments against
imposing affirmative duties, fairness seems to demand an acknowledgment that

117. Note, ConstitutionalLaw-SubstantiveDueProcess-EighthCircuitDenies
Liabilityfor Returning Child in State Custody to ParentDespiteKnou-n Potentialfor
Abuse-S.S. v. McMullen, 114 HARv. L. REV. 1653, 1657 (2001) (citing Camp v.
Gregory, 67 F.3d 1286, 1294-95 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. denied,517 U.S. 1244 (1996),
which rejected the constitutional significance of returning a child to the original
dangerous environment as opposed to a new one).
118. See Schriwer,supranote 2, at 390-91.
119. See Schriwer, supra note 2, at 391 ('The debate becomes an academic
exercise in a particularly even-handed game of ping pong.').
120. See DeShaneyv. Winnebago CountyDep't ofSoc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 21213 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Gerhardt, supranote39, at438. Notwithstanding
the Court's insistence in DeShaney that it is bound to interpret § 1983 claims strictly,
a unanimous Court
[I]ittle more than a month [before DeShaney]....
acknowledged in a different context that the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, the
predecessor to the civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, was a remedy
"against those who representing a State in some capacity were unable or
unwilling to enforce a state law." The "paradigmatic section 1983 claim in
1871," Justice Marshall wrote, "involved a victim of violence or harassment
who sued state officials for failing to prevent the harm." It would seem,
therefore, that there is nothing in the civil rights statute itselt nor in the
fourteenth amendment, whichitwas designed to enforce, that necessarily bars
the cause of action that the DeShaney Court refused to recognize.

Laura Oren, The State's Failureto Protect Children and Substantive Due Process:
DeShaney in Context, 68 N.C. L. REV. 659,663-64 (1990) (quoting Ownes v. Okure, 488
U.S. 235,250 n.11 (1989) (internal citations omitted)).
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"for every argument against finding affirmative governmental duties, there is a
matching and equally compelling reason to do so.' ' 1
Perhaps more disturbing is the failure of the court inMcMullen to find in the
state's transfer of S.S. to her father's care the sort of state action that shocks the
conscience. Although it is firmly rooted in Supreme Court jurisprudence," the
effect of the "shocks the conscience" standard goes beyond what the Court claims
is an attempt to stem the flow of constitutional tort litigation. The unfortunate
byproduct of employing the standard to so admirable an end is that it eviscerates
the Fourteenth Amendment of any power it otherwise might possess to enable
courts to protect citizens from governmental abuse." By raising the bar, a
plaintiffmust clear in order to state a claim under § 1983 to such lofty heights that
even reckless indifference to a citizen's welfare is likely to be insufficient, 24 the
Court has frustrated any real chance of success for the substantive due process
claims of some of society's most vulnerable individuals-abused children.
Moreover, the court of appeals inMcMullen, bymechanically applying an unduly
stringent "shocks the conscience" standard to S.S.'s claim, failed to recognize that
its analysis was, in the end, a case-specific determination. Rather than look for

121. Schriwer, supranote 2, at 391. Regarding the Court's recent invigoration of
federalism and Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity jurisprudence, see supranote
43. Professor Akhil Reed Amar argues persuasively that such a doctrine is
"constitutional nonsense" and "quite literally, the precise negation of the Founders' root
idea that the People are sovereign and governments are not. There is no constitutional
right for government to violate the Constitution and get away with it, even if sovereign
immunity was a traditional concept at the Founding." Akhil Reed Amar, The Supreme
Court 1999 Term: Foreword: The Document andthe Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26,
115 (2000). Amar argues further that:
[c]ases like [Kimel v. FloridaBoardofRegents] ...fail to check abuses or
redress wrongs, instead allowing states to escape liability for their illegal acts.
Asounder... approach, building on the very Founding sources that the Court
has invoked but failed to follow, would use federalism to protect rights, not
defeat them. Each government would have reciprocity not in shielding itself
when it violates the Constitution, but in empowering citizens to gain full
remedies when the other government violates the Constitution. In this view,
the federal government should be recognized as having broad power to arm
Americans with remedies against states when states violate the Constitution
or valid federal laws.
Id. at 116-17.
122. See, e.g., County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 848 (1998); Rochin
v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 174 (1952).
123. See SusanBandes, The Negative Constitution:A Critique, 88 MIcH. L. REv.
2271, 2313 (1990).
124. See S.S. ex rel.Jervis v. McMullen, 225 F.3d 960, 964 (8th Cir. 2000) (en
banc), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 1227 (2001).
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factual "similarity between our case and the Supreme Court cases in which a
complaint was held to be [conscience shocking]," the court of appeals might
have served S.S.'s constitutional interests better by addressing the facts before it
on their own terms and placing less emphasis on inflexible
and-arguably-flawed precedent
The concerns discussed abovenotwithstanding, the currenttenorofSupreme
Court jurisprudence makes it unlikely that any broadening of the states'
Fourteenth Amendment liability is forthcoming.'
Given the Court's
unwillingness to interpret the Fourteenth Amendment as imposing affirmative
duties upon the states and its continued adherence to the prohibitive "shocks the
conscience" standard for evaluating substantive due process claims, another
avenue of relief is needed. Itmaybe appropriate, for states wishing to afford their
constituents the safeguards federal courts are largely unwilling to provide, to
follow the suggestion of Chief Justice Rehnquist, which concluded the majority
opinion in DeShaney:
The people of Wisconsin may well prefer a system of liability which
would place uponthe State and its officials the responsibility for failure
to act in situations such as the present one. They may create such a
system, if they do not have it already, by changing the tort law of the
State in accordance with the regular lawmaking process.'"
Ifitis true that the Supreme Court "has repeatedly looked to tort law to explicate
42 U.S.C. § 1983"' due to tort law's traditional hostility toward legislating
moral imperatives to act, then it is perhaps instructive to note that tort law "can
no longer be said to follow a strict rule of punishing merely misfeasance as
opposed to nonfeasance." 1" Given the trend in tort law away from an amoral,
individualistic stance on affirmative duties in favor of a scheme that recognizes
circumstances where more may be required of a person than inaction or, even,

125. Id.
126. See, e.g., Bd.of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (5-4
decision) (holding thatEleventhAmendment sovereign immunity applied to suits against
a state under the Americans with Disabilities Act); Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528
U.S. 62 (2000) (5-4 decision) (holding that Congress exceeded its authorityinpurporting
to authorize citizen suits against a non-consenting state under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act).
127. DeShaney v. Wmnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 203
(1989).
128. Theodore Y. Blumoff, Some Morallmplications ofFindingNo StateAction,
70 NOTREDAMEL.REV. 95, 102 n.30 (1994).

129. Schriwer, supranote 2, at 396; see also Blumott, supranote 128, at 103.
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negligent good-faith action, 3 ' tort law may not afford the "cover" used by the
Supreme Court in this area that it once did. The nascent shift toward a tort system
that calls for a so-called "duty to rescue" in a non-negligent manner suggests the
appropriateness of holding state actors accountable for the gross negligence that
led to the injuries suffered by S.S., Joshua DeShaney, and the untold number of
other children who are caught in the web of a child welfare system that is
overwhelmed and, often, either slow to respond or negligent in its response to the
needs of those children it is designed to protect.
It, of course, would be inaccurate and unfair to characterize the task of state
child welfare agencies as anything less than herculean. The McMullen court
correctly noted the sound public policy mandating that children remain with or be
returned to their natural parents if to do so is in the best interest of the child.'
The conflict between this policy and the inherent charge of such agencies to
combat the scourge that is child abuse too often presents underpaid, overworked
case workers with a Hobson's choice. It indeed would wreak havoc on a troubled
child welfare system to declare open season on its employees-who are already
in short supply-by reducing the standard for incurring liability for mistakes in
judgment to mere negligence."'
Still, itcannotbe satisfying to any observerthat the affirmative acts, and not
merely the inaction,of the DFS employees assigned to S.S.'s case appear to merit
no more of a sanction under current law than unfavorable dictum in a judicial

130. See, e.g., Tarasoffv. Regents ofthe Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334,346-47 (Cal.
1976).
131. The importance of family privacy and autonomy has deep roots in Supreme

Court jurisprudence. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766-69 (1982)
(establishing "clear and convincing evidence" as the minimum standard a state must meet
to deprive parents of custody of their children); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S.
494, 504 (1977) (invalidating a municipal housing ordinance that purported to define the
term "family" for the purpose oflimitinghousehold occupancy); Wisconsinv. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205, 234-35 (1972) (Amish children are not required to attend school until age
sixteen as required by a state statute.); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972)
(state law that prohibited distribution of contraceptives to single persons violated the
FourteenthAmendment's equal protection clause); Meyerv. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,403
(1923) (state law prohibiting the teaching of children in languages other than English
invalidated).
132. Foregoing individual social worker liability in favor of state liability
unfortunately would be"difficult to accomplish... undercurrent Supreme Court doctrine
of Section 1983 municipal (government) liability." Oren, supranote 120, at729; see also
Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (finding states not liable as
"persons" under § 1983 in state courts); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 452 (1976)
(finding states not liable for money damages under § 1983). But see City of Canton v.
Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989) (finding the city's failure to train its police force to
constitutional standards held actionable under § 1983).
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dissent"' Barring an unforeseen shift in Supreme Court jurisprudence toward a
stance more reflective of the spirit of the Fourteenth Amendment, states
voluntarily should institute areform of tort law that would hold the feet of grossly
negligent state actors to the same fire that tort law increasingly does in the case
of individual rescuers. 34
VI. CONCLUSION
In S.S. ex rel.Jervisv.McMullen, the United States Court ofAppeals for the
Eighth Circuit applied DeShaney v. Winnebago County Departmentof Social
Services to the substantive due process claim of a girl returned to parental custody
by the state despite the state's having reason to believe that to do so was to return
the child to a dangerous situation. Because the court found the state did notplace
S.S. in a position of danger that she had not faced before, and because, even ifthe
state did so act, it did not shock the conscience of the court, S.S.'s substantive due
process claim was held invalid.
The court's decision brings into stark relief the shortcomings of the Supreme
Court's -undulystrict "negative liberties" approach to interpreting the Fourteenth
Amendment and its practice of applying a prohibitive "shocks the conscience"
standard to substantive due process claims. Despite the Court's freedom to adopt
a more lenient test of such claims, no move in that direction is readily apparent
Because the federal courts remain steadfast in their determination not to
recognize constitutional torts against children in all but the most heinous
scenarios, the situation is ripe for states to initiate tort reform aimed at holding
state actors accountable for grossly negligent affirmative acts that place children
in any position of apparent danger. To do so would mirror an ongoing and
intriguing shift in tort law from a formalistic and amoral stance on individuals'
duty to rescue in a non-negligent manner to one that more closely reflects
appropriate public policy and common decency.
BRYAN K.BERRY

133. The hyper-insulated position of the individual social worker is all the more
troubling when one recalls Justice Brennan's concem in DeShaney that the state's
"monopolization of a particular path of relief' for abused children firther isolates
endangered children. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S.
189, 203, 207 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see Oren, supranote 120, at 703.
134. See supranotes 129-30 and accompanying text.
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